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Democracy and the All-Affected Principle 
 
By Eerik Lagerspetz 
 
The All-Affected Principle has an important status in recent theoretical 
discussions on democracy. According to the principle, all who are 
affected by a decision should have a right to participate into making it. 
The principle is supposed to ground the right or optimal boundaries of 
democratic decision-making units. This paper is basically a critique of 
the principle. In the first parts of the paper, the All-Affected Principle is 
distinguished from some related principles. However, even a more 
precise version of the principle is still troubled by ambiguities. It is 
argued that Robert Goodin’s expansive reading is the only coherent 
one. However, if it is accepted, the principle cannot be used for its 
original purpose. The last parts focus on some largely unexamined 
aspects of the principle. First, the principle also works as a means of 
exclusion, not only of inclusion. Second, if, as the principle says, 
participation rights are based on interests, it is by no means obvious 
that these rights should be equal. Third, the principle cannot provide us 
with a non-institutional starting point. Nevertheless, a much weaker 
form of the principle may be plausible. 
 
Introduction 
The All-Affected Principle – also known as the “Congruence Principle”, the 
“Symmetry Principle” (Agné 2006), and even as the “Democratic Principle” 
(Zürn 2000) – has acquired an important status in recent theoretical 
discussions on democracy. The principle says, roughly, that all who are affected by 
a decision should have a right to participate into making it (Dahl 1970, p. 64). In 
recent discussions, the role of the All-Affected Principle is usually to work as 
a justificatory device which helps to avoid the paradox of democratic self-
constitution. Democracy is, according to the traditional definition, rule by the 
people – but who are the people? How should the criteria for membership of 
the demos to be determined? This question cannot be answered in a democratic 
way, for example, by taking a vote, without entering into an infinite regress. 
For how can we decide on who should be entitled to participate in that 
decision? The standard version of the Principle gives one possible answer to 
the problem. It is typically expressed as a deontological principle, purported to 
be independent of any institutional context. The very fact that a person is a 




originates from intentional human action – is considered as a source of the 
right to be a political agent. Thus, the minimal requirement for the application 
of the principle is that those who are affected are able to be political agents.  
From the principle, one is supposed to derive the right or optimal boundaries 
of democratic decision-making units (Arrhenius 2005; Näsström 2011). In the 
present interconnected world, the principle is likely to undermine the 
relevance of the existing boundaries of states and other decision-making units. 
Many people think that a consistent application of the principle will inevitably 
lead to global democracy. However, in this presentation the potentially 
expansive implications of the All-Affected Principle are not the only concern. 
Suppose that it would be really possible to establish a global democracy. 
Would it remove the problem of political boundaries from the agenda? 
Certainly not. For even the most ardent cosmopolitans would agree that the 
world government should not have the power to decide on every possible 
issue. Only a handful of very important, genuinely global issues should be 
entrusted to it. Most issues should remain to be decided at regional, national 
or local levels.  
This paper is basically a critique of the All-Affected Principle. In the first 
parts, I try to find the most plausible formulation of the somewhat vague 
principle. First, I shall distinguish it from some other related principles. A 
more precise version is still troubled by ambiguities. I argue that Robert 
Goodin’s reading of the principle (Goodin 2007) is the only coherent one. 
However, if it is accepted, the principle cannot be used for its original 
purpose, for determining (at least in principle) the boundaries between 
democratic units. In the last parts I focus on two often-mentioned but usually 
unexamined aspects of the principle. First, it also works as a means of 
exclusion, not only of inclusion. Second, if, as the principle says, participation 
rights are based on interests, it is by no means obvious that these rights 
should be equal. Third, the principle cannot provide us with a non-
institutional starting point. Nevertheless, a much weaker version of the 






1. Some related principles 
The All-Affected Principle should be distinguished from two apparently 
similar but distinct principles. First, there is the Discourse Principle formulated 
by Jürgen Habermas (1996, p. 107): an action norm is valid only if it could be 
accepted by all affected in a rational discourse. In spite of the appearances, the 
Discourse Principle has no necessary connection to the All-Affected Principle. 
It does not say that those affected should actually accept norms in rational 
discourse, or that they should have rights to give their assent or dissent. The 
Discourse Principle is satisfied by a hypothetical claim: If all the affected could 
counterfactually accept the norm in question, it is valid. The Discourse 
Principle does not presuppose agency (Skirbekk 1997). For example, the 
members of future generations cannot actually participate in our deliberations; 
hence, the All-Affected Principle does not cover them. Beckman (2009, 
Chapter. 7) treats the problem of future generations as one aspect of the All-
Affected Principle, but I think this is based on a mistake. The members of 
future generations are not political agents in our present world. The interests 
of the members of future generations may, in some sense, be represented in 
the process of deliberation, for example, by nominating someone to act as the 
representative of those interests. However, such a surrogate form of 
representation is not a form of participation. Representation is related to 
participation only when the represented are actually able to authorize their 
representatives. The surrogate representation of the unborn is not a matter of 
rights – it is only one possible arrangement which might improve the moral 
quality of the resulting decisions.   
Another similar-looking principle is called by Sofia Näsström (2011) the 
All-Subjected Principle. It says that all persons subject to a government’s 
dominion should be able to participate in decision-making (Miklosi 2012, p. 
485; Goodin 2007, p. 49; Beckman 2008). Näsström (2011, p. 121) claims that 
the All-Subjected Principle, unlike the All-Affected Principle, assumes that 
democracy is bound up with the existence of a state. Actually, the All-
Subjected Principle only assumes that there is an authoritative “government” 
or legislator. Unlike the All-Affected Principle, it is not meant to be applicable 




legislator with the modern state. Historically, the All-Subjected principle, 
unlike the All-Affected Principle is closely tied to the extension of franchise in 
modern democracies. When Olympe de Gouges, an early feminist declared in 
the French Revolution: “If women have a right to enter to the scaffold, they 
should also have the right to enter to the Legislative Assembly”, she was 
appealing to the All-Subjected Principle.   
The All-Subjected Principle emphasizes the legal rather than causal 
consequences of decisions. Beckman (2008, p.  360) argues that “since 
everyone within a jurisdiction is equally affected by the decision (because they 
are equally subjected to the political authority making the decision) it is 
possible to know ex ante who will be affected”. If this is true, it is true by 
stipulation. Those who are subjects of a government are bound to obey it – 
and if they do not obey voluntarily, they may be coerced to do it. Are they 
thereby “affected”? Yes, in a tautological sense that by enacting rules and 
other legally binding precepts the government necessarily affects the legal 
positions of its subjects.  In the empirical sense, however, many laws and 
precepts enacted by a government may be practically irrelevant for most of its 
subjects. For example, many legal duties which are part of the legal system of 
my home country are such that I, as a middle-aged academician with very little 
personal property, am unable either to obey or disobey them. Of course, even 
these parts of the Finnish legal system might have some indirect effects upon 
me, and they might become directly relevant for me in some imaginable 
future. But some parts of the legal system of some other country might have 
similar indirect effects and they might become equally relevant. While there is a 
sense in which we are necessarily “affected” by all laws of our respective 
countries, it does not follow that we are causally affected.  This observation is 
actually central for the arguments put forth in this paper.  
 
2. The full version  
The following amended version of the All-Affected Principle does, I think, 
capture the fundamental intuitions of the proponents: All competent adults should 
have an equal right to participate in decision-making if and only if their interests are likely 




comments. By adding a reference to “competent adults” I simply want to 
sweep aside controversies about the rights of children, animals, future 
generations, and natural objects. The additions “equal right”, “interests” and 
“significantly affected” deserve further comment. “If and only if” is central 
for the purposes of this paper, for it raises the issue of over-inclusiveness, 
ignored by most theorists who have written about the topic.  
I shall start with the notion of “affecting”.  When is somebody affected 
by a decision? By distinguishing the All-Affected Principle from the All-
Subjected Principle I have already excluded purely normative connections 
between decisions and those affected. However, to say that it must be a causal 
connection generates all kinds of problems. The notion of causality is, as such, 
subject to philosophical problems, and things do not become easier if we add 
that the relation in question is, at least partly, a social causality relation. The 
standard examples of effects covered by the principle are often cases of 
natural spill-over effects, for example, of chemical pollution or of increased 
risk caused by nuclear reactors (e.g. Näsström 2011, p. 123; Goodin 2007, pp. 
49-50). However, the wider discussion on the All-Affected Principle is usually 
connected to the complex effects of globalization. In this context the physical, 
chemical or biological concepts of causality are not sufficient. Generally, 
people may be affected in very different ways, and most of them are 
potentially relevant for the application of the principle. 
It is clear - so clear that it is usually left unmentioned – that only negative 
effects or “harms” may create rights to participation. J. S. Mill famously 
argued that “the only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised 
over any member of a civilized community, against his will, is to prevent harm 
to others”. When extending the notion of being affected (and perhaps also the 
notion of interest) in order to cover issues such as the consequences of  
globalization, the supporters of the All-Affected Principle should be aware of 
the problems which have traditionally troubled attempts to apply Mill’s Harm 
Principle. While the All-Affected Principle is used for very different purposes 
than the Harm Principle, the problems of application are partly similar. The 
challenge is to define “harm” in way that would exclude external or “nosy” 




contemplating the possibility that his neighbours may have homosexual 
relationships) and trivial harms  while not lapsing into a paternalistic version 
of objectivism.     
 
3. Goodin’s argument 
The main problem faced by the All-Affected Principle is the fundamental 
inadequacy of all purely causal notions of effect. Non-events (including non-
decisions) are not, according to the standard approaches, possible links in 
causal chains. If we adopt a causal interpretation of “affecting”, only those 
people whose actual situation, specified, for example, as the set of 
opportunities open to them, changes because of the decision (Beckman 2008, 
p. 355). As Robert Goodin has remarked in his seminal article (Goodin 2007), 
this interpretation is not only over-restrictive, but actually leads into 
paradoxical results. More often than not, the content of the decision 
determines which interests are actually affected by it. The problem is that 
quite often, the question of who is causally affected by a particular decision 
can be answered only when the decision has been made.  
Suppose that there are only two decision alternatives – for example, 
either accepting a project or doing nothing. A decision with one content 
would change the situation of only A (in a significant way), while choosing 
another alternative we would change the situation of only B (in a significant 
way). The “actual effect” interpretation would imply that only A is entitled to 
participate in the first case and only B in the second case. However, it is 
plausible to say that whichever alternative is chosen in our example, the 
interests of both A and B are affected.  Our intuition is that an adequate 
version of All-Affected Principle would mandate the participation of both A 
and B. Perhaps the proper formulation of the principle is that all who could 
possibly be affected by a decision should have right to participate? The 
consequences of this move seem to be dramatic. Any resource, say, one dollar 
or an hour of one’s time, used for one purpose, could equally well be used for 
some other purpose. The conclusion seems to be that all people in the world 




participate in making them. Many would see this a reductio ad absurdum 
conclusion. Goodin, however, is willing to subscribe to it:  
If (as I believe to be the case) the “all affected interests” principle is the best 
principled basis upon which to constitute the demos, and if (as I have argued) the 
best interpretation of that principle is the expansive “possibilist” form, then it does 
indeed provide good grounds for thinking that (at least in principle) we should give 
virtually everyone a vote on virtually everything virtually everywhere in the world. (Goodin 2007, 
p.  64; my emphasis) 
Less surprisingly, Goodin admits that the arrangement envisaged in the 
last sentence is not practically feasible. He continues: “If, as many would 
insist, that is wildly impractical then we need to begin thinking what 
arrangements might best approximate that ideal in some practice that is feasible” 
(idem, my emphasis). There are several problems related to the notion of 
approximation of a strictly unattainable ideal (cf. Räikkä 2014). One problem is 
that “best approximation” presupposes a measure of betterness or closeness; 
otherwise it would be impossible to judge whether one institution or decision 
lies closer to the ideal than another. If the ideal is a complex one, to be 
described only in terms of a conjunction of several requirements, its different 
aspects have somehow to be weighed. Otherwise we may end up with a 
version of the Condorcet paradox in which arrangement C is closer to the 
ideal than arrangement D in one sense, D is closer than E in another sense, 
but E is closer than C in a third sense.  
Arrhenius (2012) compares the All-Affected Principle with the principle 
of utility maximization, arguing that while the former cannot used as a 
decision method, it may,  like utilitarianism,  work as an ideal which may 
justify practical decision-rules. However, I think that the problem of 
approximation undermines the analogy. First, in utilitarianism, the 
requirement of utility maximization is the single supreme principle. Second, 
utility is supposed to be explicable in cardinal terms. Hence, there is a well-
defined measure of closeness. The principle of utility maximization is, at least 
in theory, able to solve all disagreements between competing decision-rules of 
lower level. If, for example, it is practically impossible to compare the utility 




utility-maximizing option from some manageable subset. By contrast, the All-
Affected Principle cannot be but one normative requirement among many.   
Consider the following situation. Group F is the total group of all who are 
affected by some decision. (If Goodin is right, F necessarily consists of all 
humankind.)  Group G is a subgroup of F, for example, the group of all the 
members of some state. H is a subgroup of G (and hence a sub-subgroup of 
F) for example, the group of all the members of a local community. Now, if a 
decision cannot, for practical reasons, made by all the members of F, does it 
follow from the All-Affected Principle that the second-best solution is to 
make it at the level of G? No, it does not. For the same (or other) reasons 
which made it impractical and perhaps even immoral to transfer the decision 
to the level F may also be reasons against transferring it to the level G.  
Now we are able to see the basic problem of Goodin’s expansive 
“possibilist” reading of the principle. People became attracted by the All-
Affected Principle mainly because they thought that it would provide 
normative guidelines for drawing the boundaries between decision-making 
units, a task the standard democratic theories were unable to perform. 
However, according to Goodin’s interpretation,   the consistent application of 
the principle implies that in the ideal case, there are no justifiable boundaries. 
Ideally, “everyone in the world (…) should be entitled to vote on any proposal 
or any proposal for proposals” (Goodin 2007, p. 55). This is, of course, 
unfeasible.  In any feasible approximation of the ideal the participation rights 
have to be limited; there should be boundaries. But the All-Affected Principle 
has already exhausted its usefulness. Boundaries are necessary but they cannot 
be drawn by using it as a normative yardstick. Thus, something else is needed. 
We are back in square one. Hence, those who still think that the All-Affected 
Principle could be useful in solving the boundary problem should take 
Goodin’s interpretation as their main target. They should either show that 
Goodin’s conclusion does not follow from the standard version of the All-
Affected Principle, or they should formulate a nonstandard version supported 
by the same intuitions which made the standard version initially appealing. 
Actually, this argument should be sufficient, for it moves the burden of proof 




think that the principle has other interesting aspects which have not yet been 
sufficiently examined. By studying the principle and its background 
justifications more closely it may be possible to put more structure into it. For 
the sake of argument, I shall assume that there is some way to avoid Goodin’s 
extreme conclusions.  
 
4. On over-inclusion 
The reverse side of the All-Affected Principle, as I have already indicated, 
seems to be that only those who are affected should have right to participate.  
The background justification of the Principle is the value of self-government.  
As Näsström (2011, p.  123) says, the Principle “draws its normative force 
from the modern notion of self-rule. (…) The central thrust is that citizens 
should be not determined by decision-making powers beyond their own 
control.” From the ideal of self-rule follows an often unarticulated aspect of 
the Principle: Those who are not affected by a decision are not entitled to 
participation. This consequence is not self-evident, but a further consideration 
shows why it is needed. Consider the following extreme case: One thousand 
people (Group I) are affected by a decision. Therefore, they are all allowed to 
participate in making it. At the same time, one million people (Group J) who 
are not affected in any significant way are equally allowed to participate. 
Clearly, the basic idea behind the All-Affected Principle is violated. Those 
who are really affected are not masters of their own fate. They are at the 
mercy of the unaffected.  An inclusion principle arising from the fact of being 
affected would pick those and only those who are really affected. 
Goodin claims that over-inclusion is never a problem. He argues as 
follows. Suppose that people vote only on the basis of their (significant) 
interests. If some issue affects only the interests of the small sub-group I, 
those in the one-million large group J are, ex hypothesi, likely to cast their votes 
randomly. If there are only two decision alternatives about 500 000 members 
would vote for one alternative, and the remaining 500 000 for another 
alternative. These votes would cancel each other, and those who really have 
something at stake, the members of  Group I, would determine the outcome. 




therefore, if we enfranchise people whose interests are not affected. All that 
we have to worry about is ensuring the inclusion of everyone whose interests 
are affected.” (Goodin 2007, pp. 58-9) Actually, if people are supposed to 
vote only on the basis of their interests, and if those in Group J literally had 
no interests at stake, they would abstain, leaving the issue to the members of 
Group I.  If this were true, it would always be better to submit a decision to a 
larger group. Suppose first that the groups initially made their decisions 
separately.  If the larger Group J then decides to annex the smaller Group I, 
no harm is done as long as the members of Group I retain their equal rights to 
participation. In effect, all demands for secession, autonomy, regional 
devolution or decentralization within democratic countries would be 
pointless. Unfortunately, the supposition is not realistic. In real life, people 
often vote on the basis of the trivial or mistaken interests, or of nosy 
preferences, or old deeply-rooted prejudices. The problem in Goodin’s 
argument is that the minority’s ability to rule itself becomes conditional to the 
majority’s contingent preferences.  As Beckman (2014) has argued, the right to 
exclude may be as significant for self-government as the right to include. 
If this argument is correct, we should be worried about possible cases of 
over-inclusion and not only of under-inclusion. For example, it is by no 
means clear that all those who are, in modern democracies, included into the 
demos are causally affected by the decisions made by them or by their 
representatives. Most decisions affect sub-groups only: such as the elderly, 
families with children, workers working in specific industries, ethnic 
minorities, sexual minorities, farmers, people suffering from a specific 
handicap, people living in a certain territory, or those with specific 
consumption habits etc. etc. In fact, modern democracies do try to cope with at 
least one such discrepancy in a systematic way. Many decisions are delegated 
to the local level, mainly because they are considered to have only local 
effects. However, the spatial distribution of effects, while important, is only 
one of the possible dimensions, and there are very few systematic attempts to 
take the other dimensions into account. Hence, it should not be taken as 




consistently applied within modern democracies, and that the only question is 
how to extend its application to transnational or global contexts. 
 
5. On equality 
The proponents of All-Affected Principle usually take it for granted that those 
who are affected have equal rights to participation. This unquestioned 
supposition establishes the connection between the All-Affected Principle and 
democracy, for democracy is traditionally considered as the government of 
equals. However, there is no immediate reason why the sheer fact of being 
affected in some way should establish equal rights. An effect upon my 
interests may be trivial, significant, or dramatic. Clearly, these are, at least 
partly, relative notions: a monetary loss considered as significant in most 
contexts may pale in comparison if other people literally have their lives at 
stake. Even if interests which are trivial in all comparisons are discounted, it is 
not self-evident that all the remaining interests should be treated as equals. As 
David Miller says 
insofar as the [All-Affected] principle is meant to reflect the underlying idea that 
people should have an equal opportunity to advance and protect their interests 
politically, it seems that in applying it we should try to ensure that each person’s 
capacity to influence a decision should correspond to how significantly he or she will 
be affected by its outcome. (Miller 2009, p. 216) 
Here, it might be useful to glance backwards. Before the twentieth 
century, there was no presumption for equal rights in political participation. 
Contrary to what is sometimes thought, there was plenty of participation and 
collective deliberation even before the advent of modern democracy. 
However, there was no presumption that all people had a right to participate 
in equal terms. Especially in local elections, multiple-vote systems were widely 
used until the beginning of the twentieth century. In Belgium, for example, 
land-owners had one additional vote and citizens with higher education two 
additional votes; in Saxony, voters had 1 to 4 votes; and in the Swedish and 
Finnish local elections voting rights were graded: voters had 1–100 votes, 
depending on the amount of taxes they paid. After the Sturges-Bourne Act in 
1819, English local government votes were also graded, the maximum number 




special constituencies. In Prussia, for example, voters were divided into three 
classes on the basis of the taxes paid. Each class elected a third of the electors, 
and they in turn elected the deputies to the Landtag. The two classes of the 
high income taxpayers – 13−20 percent of the adult male population – could 
therefore dominate Prussian politics.   In the Danish local elections, the high 
income taxpayers – one fifth of all – elected a half plus one of the members of 
the communal councils, while in France after 1831, three fourths of the 
members of the communal councils were elected by those with high incomes. 
(Mellquist 1974, pp. 30-33.) 
It is interesting that the pre-democratic unequal systems of 
representation partly justified themselves by referring to the unequal effects of 
decisions. Of course, these political systems based on unequal representation 
were instruments of class domination, and the theories which justified the 
systems were elements of the ideology of the ruling classes. Nevertheless, 
these ideologies were at least internally consistent: the interests of some 
people – those who had more possessions or paid more taxes – were more 
affected by the public decisions than those of the rest of the population. 
Therefore, the more affected were entitled to have more influence. Nowadays 
we might perhaps adopt a different measure of “being affected” than just, say, 
the amount of taxable property. But if the fundamental justification of the 
rights to participation in decision making is that the decisions have an impact 
upon people’s interests, it is natural to think that these rights should, in 
principle, be allocated according to the magnitudes of the impact.   
All these practices were swept away by successive waves of 
democratization. This equalization process has been unidirectional. Although 
there have been coups and revolutions in democratic states, in the twentieth 
century no democratic state has peacefully returned to less inclusive or less 
egalitarian practices (Colomer 2001). There are almost no cases in which large 
formerly enfranchised groups would again become disenfranchised without 
violence and a break-up of the established constitutional order. This is true 
even of age limits, which are the least “political” of all the exclusion principles. 
These limits are almost never moved upwards. It is significant that in 




or to make them more unequal would be rejected almost unanimously.  
Participation rights are not considered as bargaining chips tradable for other 
goods or as instruments which could be used for the purposes of social 
engineering. Economic and other hardships are not compensated by giving 
the worst-off additional votes.  
Several theorists have argued that a system based on equal votes and the 
majority principle is defective because it treats unequal interests in an equal 
way. G. D. H. Cole, a radical Guild Socialist once stated that  
to count once is to count about nothing in particular: what men want is 
to count on the particular issues in which they are interested. Instead of 
‘One man, one vote’, we must say ‘One man as many votes as interests, 
but only one vote in relation to each interest’. (Cole 1920/1989, pp. 89-
90) 
Closer to our times, Jones (1983), and Brighouse & Fleurbaey (2010) 
have advocated decision-methods which would, in different ways, take into 
account the various interests of voters and to balance them in a fair way. All 
these proposals are built on a common presupposition that (1) the issues, (2) 
the affected interests, and (3) the magnitude of the effects of possible 
decisions are already fixed and knowable. Moreover, (4) there must be a 
consensus on what is the fair way to balance them. All these factors together 
determine how, and by whom the decision is made. In other words, the 
proposed non-egalitarian decision methods are built on the supposition that 
the most important divisive problems in politics have already been solved.  In normal 
politics, political disputes are largely about the issues (1)-(4). As Waldron 
(1999) says, the “mechanical” principle of majority is widely accepted because 
recourse to a “non-mechanical” procedure would reproduce rather than 
resolve the decision-problem in front of us.   
To sum up, the principle of approximate voter equality has a near-
absolute status in modern democracies. Thus, it seems that there is actually a 
tension between the principle of political equality of citizens and the interest-
based All-Affected Principle. It is not clear why the unequal systems used in 
the past would not be compatible with the All-Affected Principle. But surely, 




underlying idea of democracy is not just that people should have an equal 
opportunity to advance and protect their interests politically. 
 
6. On citizenship 
The role of the All-Affected Principle in recent discussion is to challenge the 
existing political boundaries. The argument is that by just taking the existing 
nation-states as granted we actually ignore important moral and political 
questions, and by trying to determine the boundaries in a democratic way 
leads into an infinite regress. According to the argument, we need a pre-
institutional starting point. However, the All-Affected Principle cannot give us 
the starting point, for the following reason. People’s interests are largely 
created and shaped by political institutions, in the present world largely by the 
states. Therefore, it is equally misleading to take some hypothetical 
institutionally unaffected interests as the starting point and then ask how, 
given the interests, the proper boundaries of decision-making units should be 
drawn.  
We have seen that the principle of political equality – inclusive suffrage 
and equal voting rights –cannot be justified by supposing an equality of 
interests. Our significant interests are not causally affected by all the decisions 
made within our states; certainly, we are not equally affected by them. We may, 
however, be “affected” in another sense. Consider decisions that would have 
(causal) effects only on members of an ethnic or sexual minority, or on 
drafted soldiers, or on immigrants. I do not belong to any of these categories. 
Any causal effect flowing from the decisions would be an indirect one. I may 
be personally unable either to obey or to disobey the decisions; hence, I am 
not subjected to them.  Nevertheless, the decisions are directly relevant to my 
interests as a citizen, that is, as a member of a particular democratic polis. They 
are made also in my name, by representatives elected by us, in a country which 
is constituted by us. We may be concerned, worried, or delighted by similar 
decisions made elsewhere, in other countries, but they do not concern us in 
the same way, as citizens. All the citizens are “equally affected” by political 
decisions made by their government because these decisions concern res 




The “fact” that the citizens are equally affected is a normative supposition, 
not an observation about the independently existing causal structure of the 
world. In the causal sense, I may be affected more by the decisions made, for 
example, by the government of the United States than by those made by my 
own government. This fact does not create a right for me to participate in the 
political process of the US, although it may create a duty to the US 
government to take my interests somehow into account. 
It is significant that the All-Affected Principle is not offered as a 
justification of equal rights to participation outside the context of politics. 
Private firms, universities, the media, bureaucracies, churches, hospitals, 
armies, international organizations etc. make decisions which have significant 
effects upon the people living and working inside their spheres of influence. 
Quite often, there are institutional means for those affected to express their 
opinions and interests and even to participate into the internal decision-
making of the organizations. These practices may be justified in terms of 
something like the All-Affected Principle. However, in organizational contexts 
the relevant forms of participation do not usually amount to a right to equal 
participation. In many cases, organizations apply practices compatible with the 
traditional corporatist model: various interest groups may have their 
representatives in governing bodies, or there may be regular consultation or 
negotiation processes in which the interested parties are represented. The 
affected people are represented as members of the affected groups, not as 
individuals. As individuals, they are not entitled to equal power. It seems that 




The conclusion of this paper is that the All-Affected Principle does not 
provide us with the missing Archimedean point. However, two qualifications 
should be made. The practices adopted by various institutions and 
organizations show that the widely shared intuition underlying the All-
Affected Principle needs not be totally mistaken. A weaker version of the 




only if the consequences of Goodin’s expansive reading can somehow be 
controlled. In most contexts, the fact of being affected does create a prima facie 
right to be heard. If the decisions made in some organization have a significant 
effect upon my life and my interests, I do have a right to present my 
viewpoint to the decision-makers. I may have a formal right to be informed 
and consulted, a right to defend myself in public or to respond to criticism, to 
make an appeal, a complaint, or a lawsuit, sometimes even a right to demand a 
re-consideration of a decision. This general right to be heard – which may take 
different institutional forms in different contexts – arises from the “raw” 
causal fact that my life is in a significant way affected by the decision. In many 
contexts, the practical application of the right is strictly tied to this fact; those 
who cannot prove that they are affected in the relevant sense - those who are 
not employees, customers, members etc. of the relevant organizations - have 
no right to be heard. In a sense, the right to participate in the nation-wide 
political decisions may also be seen as an instance of the weaker and more 
general right to be heard. But without additional premises, the right to be 
heard is insufficient to explain why hearing should take the form of equal, 
democratic participation. This could be explained only by appealing to the 
specific nature of the context, the modern state.  
The All-Affected Principle is often used as a cornerstone in defences of 
global or transnational democracy. From my arguments it follows that the 
principle cannot have such status. It does not follow, however, that there is no 
case for global democratic institutions. There are difficult collective action 
problems on a transnational or global scale – global warming is only one 
example. It is possible that such problems cannot be solved without strong 
global institutions. In order to work, such institutions have to possess 
sufficient powers, including, perhaps, coercive powers, and, in order to 
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